2011/2012 March PF Topic: Aid to Pakistan
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About the Product
Author(s) and/or Contributor(s): Stephen Babb, Jessica Bailey, Jeff Roberts, Adam Torson
Description: Topic analysis and evidence for the March 2012 PF Topic. Topics covered include the Pakistan’s policy toward terrorist groups, the prospect of economic development, Pakistan’s role in regional stability, and much more.
File Index
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2
TOPIC ANALYSIS BY STEPHEN BABB 5
TOPIC ANALYSIS BY JESSICA BAILEY 17
TOPIC ANALYSIS BY JEFF ROBERTS 29
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE 49
MILITARY AID HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN IMPROVING PAKISTAN’S ABILITY TO FIGHT TERRORISM AND IN SOME CASES HAS SUPPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 49
THE PAKISTANI MILITARY HAS REFUSED TO STRIKE AT TALIBAN STRONGHOLDS AND MANIFESTLY AIDS ISLAMIST GROUPS 50
PAKISTAN HAS CONTINUED TO SUPPORT AN ANTI-U.S. TERROR GROUP 51
PAKISTAN APPEARS TO HAVE HARBORED OSAMA BIN LADEN 52
PAKISTAN’S GOVERNMENT HAS LONG BEEN INEFFECTIVE AND CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTS THE SPREAD OF RADICALISM WITHIN ITS BORDERS 53
THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN HAVE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT STRATEGIC GOALS 54
PAKISTAN IS UNABASHEDLY SUPPORTING TERRORISTS AND THE U.S. MUST MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT 55
THE U.S. MUST SUSPEND AID TO PAKISTAN OR ELSE IT WILL APPEAR WEAK IN THE REGION 56
THE U.S. CANNOT TRUST PAKISTAN’S MILITARY, WHICH CURRENTLY CONTINUES ITS SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN 57
AFTER KILLING BIN LADEN IN PAKISTAN, SUSPENDING AID IS A KEY WARNING THAT THE U.S. WILL NO LONGER TOLERATE DUPLICITY 58
THE U.S. HAS FROZEN A PORTION OF ITS AID TO PAKISTAN TO SPUR BETTER COOPERATION IN ELIMINATING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN USE IN THE REGION 59
ONGOING U.S. AID HAS NOT MITIGATED PAKISTAN’S HOSTILITY TOWARD INDIA 60
SUSPENDING AID TO PAKISTAN WILL BENEFIT RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL US ALLIES LIKE INDIA 61
DESPITE FOREIGN AID, PAKISTAN STILL TENDS TO VIEW THE UNITED STATES AS AN ENEMY 62
PAKISTANIS BELIEVE THAT U.S. AID IS AIMED ONLY AT FURTHERING U.S. INTERESTS, AND SO ANTI-AMERICANISM PERSISTS DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL AID 63
THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP HAS LONG BEEN ONE OF MUTUAL DISTRUST; AID AND MILITARY SUPPORT SHOULD ONLY BE PROVIDED WHEN PAKISTAN COMPLIES TO ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES AND SPECIFICALLY REQUESTS AID 64
PAKISTAN HAS USED FOREIGN AID AS AN EXCUSE NOT TO EXPAND ITS TAX BASE TO PAY FOR DEVELOPMENT 65
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES SHOW THAT FOREIGN AID DOES NOT CREATE STRONGER ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE LONG RUN 66
FOREIGN INVESTMENT DRIVES DEVELOPMENT MORE THAN DIRECT AID 67
MANY STUDIES HAVE FOUND THAT ECONOMIC AID DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPMENT AND SPECULATED THAT THIS IS DUE TO UNSTABLE MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 68
FOREIGN AID HAS FAILED TO MEANINGFULLY TRANSFORM LIFE FOR THE AVERAGE PAKISTANI 69
AID WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNLESS COUPLED WITH SOUND MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 70
EMPIRICALLY, U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH PAKISTAN HAS FAILED AND AID FUNDS ARE USED WITH POOR OVERSIGHT 71
U.S. AID HAS STRENGTHENED PAKISTAN’S MILITARY RATHER THAN BUILDING ITS DEMOCRATIC AND HUMANITARIAN INSTITUTIONS 72
PARTIAL SUSPENSION OF AID LAST YEAR JOLTED PAKISTAN INTO A MORE CONCILIATORY POSTURE 73
IT’S TIME FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE STANCE AGAINST PAKISTAN; ENGAGEMENT WILL NOT WORK 74
THE U.S. SHOULD NORMALIZE TRADE RELATIONS RATHER THAN RELYING ON AID THAT ULTIMATELY BENEFITS AN UNTRUSTWORTHY PAKISTANI MILITARY 75
THE U.S. SHOULD CUT AID IN ORDER TO PUNISH PAKISTAN’S UNACCEPTABLE TREATMENT OF WOMEN 76
WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES, PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO TOLERATE ATROCITIES AGAINST WOMEN IN THE STATUS QUO 77
PAKISTANI CITIZENS BELIEVE THEY WOULD BENEFIT FROM REDUCED U.S. AID, BECAUSE THEY WILL HAVE INCREASED SOVEREIGNTY AND WON’T BE DRAWN INTO U.S. CONFLICTS 78
SUSPENSION IS PREFERABLE TO TOTALLY CUTTING OFF AID 79
NEGATIVE EVIDENCE 80
DESPITE ENDURING DIFFERENCES, THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN ARE MUTUALLY DEPENDENT FOR EACH OTHER’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS 80
CUTTING AID WILL NOT CHANGE PAKISTAN’S APPROACH TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND MAY PREVENT THEM FROM TAKING ACTION AGAINST AL QAEDA 81
SUSPENDING AID WOULD ONLY ISOLATE AND DESTABILIZE PAKISTAN, WHICH HARMS U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS 82
DETERIORATING TIES FUELED BY THREATS TO CUT OFF AID COULD SUBSTANTIALLY DESTABILIZE PAKISTAN POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, HARMING U.S. VITAL INTERESTS IN THE REGION 83
TO CUT OFF AID TO PAKISTAN WITHOUT SOLID PROOF THAT IT SHELTERED OSAMA BIN LADEN WOULD BE A STRATEGIC BOONDOGGLE 84
PERIODIC SUSPENSIONS OF AID ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE PAKISTAN’S FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS ABOUT ITS TERRORISM POLICY 85
SUSPENDING AID JUST FUELS THE DETERIORATION OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 86
A PARTIAL SUSPENSION OF AID LEAVES MORE ROOM TO REPAIR U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS THAN A TOTAL SUSPENSION 87
WITHDRAWING AID NOW WOULD SIGNAL TO PAKISTAN THAT THE U.S. ONLY EVER INTENDED TO USE IT FOR THE STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF KILLING OSAMA BIN LADEN, FURTHER FOMENTING ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT 88
REDUCING AID WILL THREATEN U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN, BECAUSE PAKISTAN WILL REDUCE TROOP PRESENCE ON THE BORDER 89
REDUCING AID WILL DAMAGE LONG-TERM RELATIONS WITH THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE 90
ENGAGEMENT REMAINS ESSENTIAL TO THE U.S. LONG-TERM STRATEGY WITH PAKISTAN 91
THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN ARE VERY REAL, AND THE U.S. SHOULD PURSUE CLOSER TIES ON MULTIPLE FRONTS 92
PAKSITAN’S TIES TO TERRORISTS ARE OVERBLOWN AND NOT A REASON FOR THE U.S. TO REDUCE COOPERATION 93
THE U.S. SHOULD INCREASE AID TO PAKISTAN INSTEAD OF REDUCING IT 94
THE U.S. SHOULD TRANSFORM ITS AID TO PAKISTAN RATHER THAN CUTTING IT 95
PAKISTANI DEVELOPMENT IS VITAL TO FURTHER US INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 96
IMPROVING PAKISTAN’S EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES IS VITAL TO CREATING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PAKISTANI YOUTH 97
U.S. AID IS NECESSARY TO IMPROVE PAKISTAN’S ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 98
U.S. AID IS NECESSARY TO IMPROVE PAKISTANI AGRICULTURE 99
U.S. AID IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE PAKISTAN’S HEALTHCARE INFRASTRUCTURE 100
THE U.S. CAN USE THE PROMISE OF AID TIED TO DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL GOVERNANCE OF PAKISTAN 101
SEVERAL STUDIES HAVE FOUND A CORRELATION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AID AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PAKISTAN 102
STUDIES FIND A POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN AID AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 103
DESPITE CONCERNS ABOUT POOR GOVERNANCE, FOREIGN AID CORRELATES TO STRONGER GROWTH RATES 104
SHIFTING AWAY FROM MILITARY AID AND FOCUSING ON BETTER GOVERNANCE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ARE THE BEST WAYS TO STABILIZE PAKISTAN 105
RATHER THAN SUSPENDING AID, THE U.S. SHOULD REPURPOSE AID DOLLARS TO MORE EFFECTIVELY COMBAT TERRORISM AND HELP PAKISTAN DEVELOP ECONOMICALLY 106
U.S. FOREIGN AID SUPPORTS IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN PAKISTAN 107
FOREIGN AID IS DESIGNED TO SPUR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FOUR MAIN WAYS 108
TYING AID TO COOPERATION IS A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY TO INCENTIVIZE POLICY CHANGE IN PAKISTAN THAN CUTTING OFF AID 109
THE U.S. IS OBLIGED TO HELP REDRESS THE LONG TERM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN CAUSED BY U.S. SUPPORT OF ITS MILITARY DICTATORSHIP DURING THE COLD WAR 110
U.S. SUPPORT OF BAD REGIMES IN PAKISTAN DURING THE COLD WAR CREATES AN OBLIGATION TO HELP THE COUNTRY RECOVER 111
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If you do not want to order online, and would prefer to send in your order using email, fax, mail or phone, download and print the ORDER FORM.
If you have questions, please email help@victorybriefs.com or call 310-472-6364.