Having lost on “risk of a violation” twice last weekend, I am probably biased here, but I don’t think there is ever a situation where this argument makes sense. If the neg reads a theory shell that “Aff must not cause extinction during AC”, I hope that there isn’t a judge who would vote neg on the shell if the aff just makes an “I meet” response and move on, and yet this is how the argument has been explained to me to function. The reason terminal defense typically doesn’t exist is that it’s impossible to predict the future with 100% confidence. “Risk of offense” makes no sense when evaluating whether a speech given in the past violated some side constraint. If you understand what the interpretation and violation are, you can resolve the debate with certainty. If there is ambiguity about the interpretation or violation, I am of the opinion that the onus is on the debater running theory to clarify what the interp and violation are.

When I wrote that the person running theory has the burden to prove the violation, I didn’t mean to imply that this burden was to prove 100% credence. I meant to criticize two common practices: (1) the claim that *any* risk of a violation is sufficient, and (2) the habit of under-explaining the violation and citing new reasons in the NR or 2AR in response to an “I meet.” I agree with PDVE that sometimes the violation has to be vague. But that doesn’t imply that any risk of a violation is sufficient, or that a debater can start with a vague violation argument and make it clearer as the round goes on.

So, is a successful “I meet” enough to completely disregard theory? I can’t see how you could vote on any argument that has literally no link. I don’t think your real question is whether an “I meet” counts as terminal defense. I think your question is actually this: how do we decide who wins the violation debate if we have divided credences? Do we say there is a sufficient link if it is more likely than not the case that there was a violation? Should we carry this mitigation to the impact level on the rule comparison?

I agree with Peter that the answers to these questions may change from round to round. But, whatever those answers are, if a debater wins an “I meet” (however much credence that requires), a successful “I meet” seems to make the impacts of theory irrelevant. To test this view, can you think of any case where the judge should evaluate theory even though the violation is more likely to be false than true?

Good point of clarification – I didn’t mean to imply that your argument about the burden of proof on theory took a stance on the degree of certainty the judge must have that a violation took place.

The rest I generally agree on. As to the question in the last sentence – I could see an argument suggesting that vagueness should be interpreted against the drafter (a common rule of construction in the law for vague contracts). Taking Peter’s topicality example as a jumping off point, the neg might argue that the AC had the duty to run a clearly topical aff, and if they obfuscated they gave the neg little choice but to run topicality; so, even if after more thorough explication it turns out that the violation is more likely false than true (the case is probably topical), we should nonetheless assume that it is not.

Whether or not that argument is persuasive will of course be dependent on the situation, and I can’t think of a more concrete scenario at the moment, so perhaps it would never come up – but something to think about.